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From an anthropological perspective, authoritative decisions are
inextricable components of social process: such decisions are made
in response to claims about particular interactions or events in so-
cial process; they are affected by a wide variety of interdependent
variables in the context of interaction; they project a future distri-
bution of values among participants in social process; and they have
varied impacts through time upon a succeeding flow of events or
value distributions. I When considered in interaction with naked
power decisions and choices within the civic domain, it is, further-
more, the aggregate flow of authoritative decisions in a community
which shapes a comprehensive public order, in the sense of major
value distributions, of that community. Even a theory about law
which conceives law in terms of rules, or is primarily concerned
about its transempirical assumptions, must, when it seeks to apply
its rules, or transempirical assumptions, to interrelations between
people, make some empirical reference, however implicit or vague,
to this "big, blooming, buzzing, confusion" which is the larger con-
text.2
* Copyright retained by Harold D. Lasswell and Myres S. McDougal. This article is
excerpted from a larger study which the authors have in progress. For earlier portions of this
study, see Lasswell & McDougal, Criteria for a Theory About Law, 44 S. Cal. L. Rev. 362
(1971); Trends in Theories About Law: Comprehensiveness in Conceptions of Constitutive
Process, 41 G. Wash. L. Rev. 1 (1972); Trends in Conceptions of Authority and Control in
ESSAYS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HONOR OF KRISHNA RAO (M. Nawaz ed. 1975).
** Ford Foundation Professor of Law and Social Sciences, Emeritus, Yale Law School;
Distinguished Visiting Professor of Law, Temple University.
*** Sterling Professor of Law, Emeritus, Yale Law School; Distinguished Visiting Pro-
fessor of Law, Temple University.
1. Cf. A. RADCLIFFE-BROWN, STRICTURE AND FuNCTION IN PRIMITIVE SOCIETY 199 (1965):
Law is a part of the machinery by which a certain social structure is maintained. The
system of laws of a particular society can only be fully understood if it is studied in
relation to the social structure, and inversely the understanding of the social structure
requires, amongst other things, a systematic study of the legal institutions.
2. It may be recalled that the pre-Socratic Greeks offered a theory about law as an
465
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The comprehensiveness and precision with which a theory
about law makes reference to the larger context of social process
must, hence, affect the quality with which both observers and others
can perform the indispensable tasks of inquiry about authoritative
decisions. The explicitness with which problems are formulated in
terms of social process events, comparable through time and across
community boundaries, has important consequences for the per-
formance of each of the various specific intellectual tasks. The clar-
ity with which basic community policies are postulated in terms of
an empirical distribution of values affects the economy and effec-
tiveness with which appropriate principles of content and procedure
can be devised for relating these policies to particular instances. The
sharpness and selectivity of the focus upon the particular events
that precipitate claims to authoritative decision determine the re-
levance and the accuracy of appraisals of past trends in decision for
their approximations to preferred community policies. The compre-
hensiveness and selectivity with which both the environmental and
predispositional factors affecting decision are specified completely
condition performance of the scientific task. Estimates of the costs
and benefits both for the particular parties and aggregate com-
munity interest of options in decision are dependent, not upon mere
extrapolations of the past, but upon the disciplined performance of
each other task, within the framework of a comprehensive map of
costs and benefits relevant to the particular decision. The devising
of alternoatives in authoritative decision better designed to secure
preferred community policies is, similarly, dependent, not merely
upon a knowledge of technical legal concepts and institutions, but
upon a realistic map of the effective power and other social processes
that condition authoritative decision.
Our inherited theories about law, the great historic emphases,
differ immensely, however, in the explicitness, comprehensiveness,
and particularity with which they make reference to the encompass-
ing social process.3 Though "the idea that law is causally deter-
integral component of empirical social process. E. HAVELOCK, THE LIBERAL TEMPER IN GREEK
POLITICS passim (1957).
3. The relevant history is sketched in J. STONE, SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF LAW AND JUSTICE
(1966); L. POSPISIL, ANTHROPOLOGY OF LAW ch. 5 (1971); N. TIMASHEFF, AN INTRODUCTION TO
THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW ch. 3 (1939); G. GURVITCH, SOCIOLOGY OF LAW 68-157 (1942); E. SCHUR,
LAW AND SOCIETY: A SOCIOLOGICAL VIEW (1968); Riesman, Toward an Anthropological Science
HeinOnline -- 37 U. Pitt. L. Rev.  467 1975-1976
1976] LEGAL THEORY 467
mined by other social phenomena and in its turn causally deter-
mines them" has "been expressed since remote times,"4 one domi-
nating tradition, deriving from ancient Western-European thinking
and strongly reinforced by certain basic presuppositions of the
transempirical and positivistic emphases, has been that law is re-
garded "as an absolute and autonomous entity, independent of
space and time, not related in any particular way to the nature of
the society, in which it exists."5 It is only with the advent of modern
social science, in its impacts upon the historical, sociological, and
American realist emphases, that we begin to get an appropriate
account taken of the inescapable interconnections of legal process
and social process. 6 Even the best of our contemporary theories
about law do not, however, always offer or suggest recourse to either
a comprehensive map of the interrelations of legal process and social
process or the more detailed procedures necessary for the effective
employment of this map in particular instances.7 Some of the inade-
quacies in our inherited theories would appear to derive both from
the absence of a clear focus upon authoritative decision and from
failure to distinguish and specify the various intellectual tasks of
inquiry.s
of Law and the Legal Profession, 57 AM. J. OF SOCIOLOGY 121 (1951); Pound, Sociology of Law
and Sociological Jurisprudence, 5 u. TORONTO L.J. 1 (1943).
4. N. TIMASHEFF, supra note 3, at 44.
5. L. POSPISIL, supra note 3, at 128; cf. J. STONE, supra note 3, at 7. A. RADCLIFFE-BROWN,
supra note 1, at 198 writes:
If you examine the literature on jurisprudence you will find that legal institutions are
studied for the most part in almost complete abstraction from the rest of the social
system of which they are a part.
In defending the possibility of "a normative jurisprudence aiming at a structural analysis
of law as a system of valid norms," Hans Kelsen writes: "During two thousand years, this
has been in fact the only intellectual approach to the phenomenon of law besides the purely
historical approach...." GENERAL ThEORY OF LAW AND STATE 162-63 (1945).
6. H. Yntema, American Legal Realism in Retrospect, 14 VAND. L. REV. 317 (1960); H.
CAIRNS, ThEORY OF LEGAL SCIENCE (1941).
7. Edwin Schur concludes that "[a]t its best then, and no matter how sociological in
orientation, jurisprudence has not approximated a genuine sociology oflaw." E. SCHUR, supra
note 3, at 18. In a sober statement of some of the difficulties in formulating relevant theory,
Willard Hurst writes:
The greatest difficulties for legal history lie in relating the formal operations of
law-passing statutues, deciding cases, making administrative orders or rules-to the
life that flowed outside the legal forms. The basic organizing ideas of this legal order
will not let us escape this effort.
Hurst, Legal Elements in American History, in LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY 14 (D. Fleming &
B. Bailyn eds. 1971) (Vol. 5 of the PERSPECTIVES IN AMERICAN HISTORY series).
8. For specifications of some of the requirements of appropriate theory, see Jones,
HeinOnline -- 37 U. Pitt. L. Rev.  468 1975-1976
468 UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:465
It has already been observed that the "natural law" frame of
reference, grounding authority in transempirical sources, exhibits a
minimum of concern for the formulation of comprehensive theory
designed to facilitate inquiry about the interrelations of authorita-
tive decision and its context of social process.DIt is this frame which
is "the most elaborated form" of the conception that law is largely
independent of time, place, and other circumstance and which has
"left little room for conceiving of law as a dynamic phenomenon and
prevented legal scholars from theorizing about legal change."10
When the primary concern of a theory is identifying or formulating
general principles of a universal character for purposes of appraisal
only, it can hardly be expected that such a theory will find need to
engage in detailed inquiry about the events that precipitate claims
to decision, the modalities of claim within decision process, the
environmental and predispositional factors that affect decision, or
the impacts of decision upon continuing social process.u Yet it
should be remembered that many of the great historic expositors of
the natural law frame have made, as we have seen before with
respect to constitutive process, 12 profound and searching criticism of
the most minute details of legal process in terms of values that can
be given empirical reference, and that no proponent of this frame
who would communicate can entirely escape reference to effective
decision and its empirical context. Indeed, one distinguished con-
temporary proponent of the natural law frame, Professor Lon Fuller,
insists that it "is only the rediscovery of a point of view which has
always been taken for granted in natural-law speculation" for mod-
erns to hold that "law is an integral part of the whole civilization of
a society, and that fruitful work in the law presupposes a familiarity
Impact Research and Sociology of Law: Some Tenative Proposals, 1966 WIS. L. REV. 331;
Auerbach, Legal Tasks for the Sociologist, 1 LAW AND SOCIETY REV. 91 (1966).
9. Lasswell & McDougal, Criteria for a Theory about Law, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 362 (1971).
10. L. POSPISIL. supra note 3, at 128-29.
11. It has often been observed that the proponents of natural law are more concerned
with appraisal than with other intellectual tasks. See E. PATIERSON, JURISPRUDENCE 332
(1953); W. FRIEDMANN, LEGAL THEORY 95 (5th ed. 1967). Note the emphases in H. ROl\IMEN,
THE NATURAL LAW (T. Hanly trans!. 1947); Selznick, Sociology and Natural Law, 6 NATURAL
L.F. 84 (1961); Strauss, Natural Law, 11 INT'L ENCYC. Soc. SCI. SO (1968); NATURAL LAW AND
MODERN SOCIETY (J. Conley ed. 1963).
12. Lasswell & McDougal, Trends in Theories about Law: Comprehensiveness in Con-
ceptions of Constitutive Process, 41 G. WASH. L. REV. 1 (1972).
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with the other social sciences, such as psychology, economics, and
sociology."[3 What Professor Fuller does not adequately emphasize
is that how law is conceived and how society is conceived, and what
are regarded as the relevant intellectual tasks of inquiry, make a
tremendous difference to the consequentiality of inquiry about the
interrelations of legal process and social process.14
One distinguishing characteristic of the historical frame of ref-
erence, in an emphasis dating back at least to Montesquieu, has of
course been its insistence that legal process cannot be realistically
studied in isolation from its larger context of social process. [5 "The
central thesis of the Lettres Persanes and of L'Esprit des Lois," as
Stone writes, [6 "that human laws and justice are the resultant of
numerous factors such as the local manners and customs and physi-
cal environment, implied that human laws as social phenomena
could be understood only by postulating the operation of cause and
effect in the social field." For Montesquieu, as many have observed,
law was an integral, organic component of a community's total cul-
ture, [7 and the theory and procedures for inquiry that he recom-
mended approach contemporary standards in emphasis upon com-
prehensiveness and contextuality.[8 Because of their complete, "in-
separable" merger of law into community process, with failure to
identify authoritative decision even for purposes of observation,
their inability to distinguish and clarify conceptions of authority
and control, and their basic insistence that in any community the
factor predominantly determining law is a "popular consciousness"
or "geist" unique to that community, Savigny and his followers
13. L. FULLER, THE LAW IN QUEST OF ITSELF 101-02 (1940).
14. In his famous article, American Legal Realism, 82 U. PA. L. REV. 429, 448, 452
(1934), Professor Fuller reviews the debate as to which of "law" and "society" has the pre-
dominant impact upon the other and concludes that they are "polar categories."
In a more recent book, Fuller concludes that: "Perhaps in time legal philosophers will
cease to be preoccupied with building 'conceptual models' to represent legal phenomena, will
give up their endless debates about definitions, and will turn instead to the analysis of the
social processes that constitute the reality oflaw." L. FuLLER, THE MORALITY OF LAw 242 (rev.
ed. 1969).
15. Mayhew, The Legal System, 9 INT'L ENCYC. Soc. SCI. 59 (1968); W. FRIEDMANN,
supra note 11, at 209; E. PATTERSON, supra note 11, at 404; J. STONE, supra note 3, at 35; E.
BODENHE[MER, JURISPRUDENCE 70 (1962); L. POSP[SIL, supra note 3, at 127.
16. J. STONE, supra note 3, at 36.
17. L. POSPISIL, supra note 3, at 129.
18. G. GURV[TCH, supra note 3, at 76.
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cannot be regarded, despite the inspiration they offer, as having
made important contribution to the development of systematic
theory and procedure for inquiry about the interrelations of law and
society. The emphasis of Maine was more upon origins and stages
of development than upon impacts, and subsequent scholarship has
not always dealt kindly with his findings about origins and stages,
but the model Maine exhibited for the meticulous, and richly de-
tailed, relating of legal concepts and practices to a host of factors
in community context has had an enormous subsequent influence
and is of abiding value. 19 More modern proponents of the historical
frame, such as Sir Paul Vinogradoff, eloquently if somewhat cau-
tiously, restate its basic postulate. Thus,
a remarkable feature in the formation of social and legal doctrines is the fact
that the principal schools of thought arise and displace one another under
the influence of actual changes in world politics, as though the material
struggle for power or property was reflected in the consciousness of thinkers
and contributed substantially to produce change in the orientation of
thoughUO
The "ideological types" offered by Vinogradoff as a theory for in-
quiry do not appear, however, to afford high promise of future en-
lightenment. The confusions of Savigny and his followers are com-
pounded in the American proponent, J. C. Carter; it may be recalled
that he regarded law as "the product of the automatic action of
society," "self-created and self-existing," and impervious to change
by direct legislative action, not conforming to established custom.21
It would appear of little consequence that he adds: "Life is an ever
unfolding spectacle of new transactions and phases of conduct,
which will forever demand the work of study and classification."22
The dominant preoccupation of the positivistic or analytical
frame of reference with the systematic classification and ordering of
technical rules emanating from established officials has largely pre-
19. L. POSPISIL, supra note 3, at 139, 143; W. FRIEDMANN, supra note 11, at 209, 214; J.
STONE, supra note 3, at 101; E. PATTERSON, supra note 11, at 410; Wilhelm, Savigny, 14 lNT'L
ENCYC. Soc. SCI. 21 (1968); Riesman, supra note 3, at 124; Redfield, Maine's Ancient Law in
the Light of Primitive Societies, 3 W. POL. SCI. Q. 574 (1950); Hoebel, Maine, 9 INT'L ENCYC.
Soc. SCI. 530 (1968).
20. P. VINOGRADOFF, I OUTLINES OF HISTORICAL JURISPRUDENCE 124 (1923).
21. J. CARTER. LAW: ITs ORIGIN, GROWTH, AND FUNCTION 129, 130 (1907).
22. [d. at 128.
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cluded proponents of this frame from any consequential concern
with social process context. In their efforts to reject and escape the
theological and metaphysical elements in earlier theories, they have
concentrated more upon the syntactic interconnections of such rules
than upon the semantic dimensions of the interactions in which
rules are employed.23 Without a consistent focus upon operations, as
well as perspectives, without the clear relation of authority and
control in a conception of decision, and without an explicit notion
of constitutive process, proponents of this frame could hardly be
expected to exhibit great interest in the exploration of the reciprocal
impacts of law and comprehensive social process.24 Thus, the most
important link which Austin sought to establish with empirical so-
cial proc~ss, in an effort to escape syntactic circularity, was, it may
be recalled, in his location of "sovereignty," or highest authority, in
a determinate person or body of persons to whom habitual obedi-
ence was paid.25 Yet the description of even this modest link was left
highly cryptic and ambiguous, and Austin's search for "the neces-
sary notions and distinctions common to all systems of law" was
scarcely the most constructive model for inquiry about the interrela-
tions of legaJ process and social process to bequeath to posterity.26
It is largely posthumous flattery, however, unintended, for Kelsen
to find "sociological elements" in "Austin's analytical jurisprud-
ence."27
For Kelsen, the problem of locating authoritative decision in
more comprehensive social process is a problem of "general sociol-
ogy" or "sociological jurisprudence," not of the "pure" theory of
law.28 Sociology may concern itself with "natural reality," such as
23. W. FRIEDMANN, supra note 11, at 276; E. BODENHEIMER, supra note 15, at 89; E.
PATIERSON, supra note 11, at 82. It is interesting that Patterson, though describing at great
length the interests of legal scholars in various social sciences, makes no attempt at synthesis.
See E. PATIERSON, supra note 11, at 50 et seq.
24. Cf. the comment on Bentham by LESLIE STEPHEN, I THE ENGLISH UTILITARIANS 269
(1900, 1950 reprinting):
He claimed to be constructing a science, comparable to the physical sciences. The
attempt was obviously chimerical if we are to take it seriously.... If he had little
psychology, he had not even a conception of "sociology."
25. Lasswell & McDougal, Trends in Conceptions of Authority and Control, in ESSAYS
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HONOR OF KRISHMA RAo (M. Nawaz ed. 1975). See E. PATTERSON,
supra note 11, at 87.
26. Morison, Some Myths about Positivism, 68 YALE L.J. 212 (1958).
27. H. KELSEN, supra note 5, at 171.
28. Cf. Pound, supra note 3, at 51:
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"the motives or intentions oflaw making authorities" or "the wishes
or interests of individuals with respect to the formation of the law
to which they are subject"; except, however, "in so far as these
motives and intentions, these wishes and interests are manifested
in the material produced by the lawmaking process" they are not
appropriate subject matter for "normative jurisprudence."29 The
"general theory of law," as conceived by Kelsen, "is directed at a
structural analysis of positive law rather than at a psychological or
economic explanation of its conditions, or a moral or political evalu-
ation of its ends."30 Thus, in his theory, quite explicitly and consis-
tently, "norms" do not have the content of anybody's actual
perspectives but are rather regarded as transcendental forms or hy-
pothetical judgments;31 authority is defined in terms of such norms,
and not of facts;32 the "efficacy" stipulated for norms is related to
whole systems, and is assumed;33 the basic "grundnorm," substi-
tuted for Austin's sovereign, is not located in empirical processes of
effective power, but is rather presupposed;34 and even the "state"
is dissolved in its empirical reference to interactions and made
identical with an equally disembodied "law."35 One can only con-
clude that Kelsen, in his effort to cleanse jurisprudence of meta-
physical elements and value judgments, has also cleansed it of any
helpful reference to what he describes as "natural reality."36
Though Hart aspires to "be of use to those whose chief interests
are in moral or political philosophy, or in sociology, rather than in
law,"37 his theory is in fact only modestly less "pure" of social pro-
cess context than that of Kelsen. He distinguishes between "the
analysis (or study of the meaning) oflegal concepts" and "historical
inquiries into the causes or origins of laws," "sociological inquiries
Kelsen has laid out a sharp line of distinction between juristic and sociological method,
and his "pure theory" of law is as exclusive of anything but the norms proceeding from
the organs of a politically organized society as was Austin's analytical jurisprudence.
29. H. KELSEN, supra note 5, at xiii.
30. [d. at xiv, 162.
31. See Lasswell & McDougal, supra note 25.
32. H. KELSEN, supra note 5, at 111.
33. [d. at 42, 119.
34. [d. at 115-16.
35. [d. at 182-83, 188.
36. W. FRIEDMANN, supra note 11, at 277-78.
37. H. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW vii (1961).
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into the relation of law and other social phenomena," and "criticism
or appraisal of law whether in terms of morals, social aims, 'func-
tions,' or otherwise," and he makes clear that his own primary inter-
est is in "analysis."38 His central focus is placed upon "rules," rather
than upon authoritative decision, because without "the notion of a
rule" there "would be nothing to distinguish" authoritative from
non-authoritative decisions, though he nowhere explains why the
empirical expectations of community members might not suffice to
make this distinction.39 His "concept of law" is achieved, as noted
earlier, by a "union" or "combination" of "primary" and "second-
ary" rules;40 yet he leaves quite mysterious who combines what with
what and how. The distinction he makes between rules with a "core
of settled meaning" and rules of "open texture" scarcely begins to
indicate the difficulties confronting an interpreter who must ascribe
an empirical reference to such rules in particular instances.41 The
most important of his "secondary rules," the "rules of recognition"
employed to establish the authority of "primary rules" of behavior,
Hart asserts to be matters of "fact" or practice, not of postulation;42
yet, as we have already emphasized, he offers little specification of
constitutive practices.43 In lieu of comprehensive inquiry about fac-
tors affecting decision and the impacts of decision, Hart, like Kel-
sen, stipulates the "efficacy" of an entire system of rules44 and in-
dulges the assumption that rules are generally obeyed.45 It may be
that, as Hart suggests, "an examination of the standard uses of
relevant expressions and the way in which these depend on a social
context" may yield important information for "descriptive sociol-
ogy":46 some may, however, be forgiven if they prefer a less re-
stricted, more comprehensive, and more direct view of the interrela-
tions of legal and social process.47
38. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 601
n.25 (1958).
39. H. HART, supra note 37, at 78, 133.
40. [d. at 77.
41. [d. at 144; Hart, supra note 38, at 607.
42. H. HART, supra note 37, at 107.
43. See Lasswell & McDougal, supra note 12, at 13.
44. H. HART, supra note 37, at 100.
45. [d. at 114.
46. [d. at vii.
47. Hughes, Professor Hart's Concept of Law, 25 MOD. L. REV. 319 (1962).
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It has been the principal mission of the sociological frame of
reference to bring the theory and procedures of modern science to
bear upon inquiry about legal process in its larger context of causes
and consequences.48 Though the general frame has been affected, or
afflicted, by changing theories and conceptions in sociology and the
other social sciences, by alleged distinctions between the "sociology
of law" and "sociological jurisprudence" more recondite than serv-
iceable, and by various affiliations with, or dependences upon, prior
metaphysical, historical, or positivistic theories, there would appear
to be a slow movement toward the formulation of appropriate theory
about law and social process, and their interrelation, and toward the
invention of more effective procedures for relevant inquiry. Thus,
the formulations of Ehrlich, commonly regarded as a pioneer in this
frame, are certainly sufficiently comprehensive in their reach: in his
theory, law is made an integral, almost indistinguishable, part of a
larger social process and he insists,49 that "the center of gravity of
legal development lies not in legislation, nor in juristic science, nor
in judicial decision, but in society itself."50 This comprehensiveness
in reach is not, however, complemented by an appropriate selectiv-
ity in focus and specified procedures for inquiry. His basic concep-
tions remain diffuse, without the necessary detailed empirical ind-
ices. For him, official decisions are propelled by "elemental forces
against which the will of man cannot prevail"51 and decisions can
be made effective only when they are in conformity with the "living
law," which "dominates life itself even though it has not been pos-
ited in legal propositions."52 "The center of gravity," he repeats,
"everywhere lies in the order which the associations create for them-
selves, and life in the state and society depends more upon the order
of the associations than upon the order which proceeds from the
state and from society."53 Authority and control, authoritative deci-
sion, and constitutive process are never, in his theory, made clearly
48. R. POUND, I JURISPRUDENCE ch. 6 (1956).
49. Lasswell & McDougal, supra note 25.
50. E. EHRLICH, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW, Foreword, xiv (Moll
trans\. 1936). See E. PATTERSON, supra note 11, at 79; W. FRIEDMANN, supra note 11, at 251;
E. BODENHEIMER, supra note 15, at 106; R. POUND, supra notd 48, at 335.
51. E. EHRLICH, supra note 50, at 154.
52. [d. at 493.
53. [d. at 119.
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distinguishable components of the encompassing, overwhelming
social process. One can only concur in the sober appraisal of Pound
that Ehrlich, despite the magnificence of his design, "had only the
beginnings of a technique of ascertaining customs of popular action
and getting at the relations of these customs to the law in the books
and the judicial and administrative processes in action. "54
Weber obviously had a vision of a comprehensive social process
and of authoritative decision as a component of such process, but
he was content to offer a number of disparate methodological
suggestions, without attempting an overall systematization in terms
of values and institutions or their equivalents.55 He did greatly em-
phasize the importance both of contextuality and of selectivity.
Contextuality he sought in the notion of social process as interac-
tion. Thus, he writes:
In general, for sociology, such concepts as "state," "association," "feudal-
ism," and the like, designate certain categories of human interaction. Hence
it is the task of sociology to reduce these concepts to "understandable" ac-
tion, that is, without exception, to the actions of participating individual
men.56
His most general aspiration he stated as:
The type of social science in which we are interested is an empirical science
of concrete reality (Wirklichkeitswissenschaft). Our aim is the understanding
of the characteristic uniqueness of the reality in which we move. We wish to
understand on the one hand the relationships and the cultural significance
of individual events in their contemporary manifestations and on the other
the causes of their being historically so and not otherwise.57
Selectivity Weber sought by recommending that scholars focus
upon segments of activity in terms of their value significance. He
emphasized repeatedly:
54. R. POUND, supra note 48, at 335.
55. MAX WEBER ON THE METHODOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 49 (E. Shils & H. Finch
eds. 1949); ct. Parsons, Introduction, in MAX WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC
ORGANIZATION 14, 15 (A. Henderson & T. Parsons trans!. 1947):
It has been pointed out that, in formulating his classification of the four types of action,
Weber neglected to develop the analysis of the structure of a social system which is a
logically necessary prerequisite of such a classification.
56. H. GERTH & C. MILLS, FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 55 (1946).
57. E. Shils & H. Finch, supra note 55, at 72.
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The concept of culture is a value-concept. Empirical reality becomes "cul-
ture" to us because and insofar as we relate it to value ideas. It includes those
segments and only those segments of reality which have become significant
to us because of this value-relevance. Only a small portion of existing con-
crete reality is colored by our value-conditioned interest and it alone is signif-
icant to us. It is significant because it reveals relationships which are impor-
tant to us due to their connection with our values.58
For economic inquiry about different segments of activity, or insti-
tutional practices, Weber invented his famous conception of "ideal
types" but it does not appear that he ever organized the various
"ideal types" with which he worked in terms of a comprehensive set
of value categories. It has already been indicated that the concep-
tions of authority and control offered by Weber were sufficiently
empirical in their reference to facilitate policy-relevant inquiry.59
The influence that Weber's recommendations and example have
had on a world-wide basis in promoting inquiry by both social scien-
tists and legal scholars is a matter of common knowledge.
It is the accolade of some that Pound's contributions to inquiry
about the interrelations of legal process and social process are the
most important an American scholar has yet produced.6o Certainly
Pound's aspiration was no less comprehensive than that of Weber.
"We study law," he wrote, "in all of its senses as a much specialized
phase of what in a larger view is a science of society."61 His purpose
was to approach law from "the side of the ideal element" and he
began "with the ideas of civilization, of social control as the means
of maintaining civilization, and of law as an agency, or in one sense
of the term, a phase of social control."62 Yet the theories and proce-
dures for inquiry Pound recommends are infected with many impre-
cisions and ambiguities which handicap this grand aspiration. His
key concept of "social control" is, as we have previously noted, left
quite diffuse in many forms and agencies.63 The most we get about
the interaction of law and other forms of social control is that "all
other agencies of social control are held to exercise disciplinary au-
58. [d. at 76.
59. Lasswell & McDougal, supra note 25.
60. E. PATIERSON, supra note 11, at 509.
61. R. POUND, SOCIAL CONTROL THROUGH LAW 7 (1942).
62. [d. at 16.
63. Lasswell & McDougal, supra note 25.
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thority subject to the law and within bounds fixed by law"64 and
that there is "movement for teamwork with the other social sci-
ences" for "the study of law as a part of a whole process of social
control."65 The closest Pound comes to offering a theoretical struc-
ture adequate to facilitate inquiry about the interrelations of au-
thoritative decision and other features of social process is in his
celebrated theory of "interests." He defines "interests," building
both upon Von Jhering and William James as "claims or wants or
desires (or, I like to say, expectations) which men assert de facto,
about which the law must do something if organized societies are
to endure";66 he subdivides interests into the three main classes of
"individual interests" ("involved immediately in the individual life
and asserted in title of that life"), "public interests" ("involved in
life in a politically organized society and asserted in title of that
organization"), and "social interests" ("involved in social life in
civilized society and asserted in title of that life") ;67 and he suggests
further elaborate subdivision and particular specification for each
major class of interests. With explicit and appropriate relation to
major values and institutional practices of each particular interest,
Pound's theory might be refashioned into a comprehensive and
homogeneous framework for facilitating performance of all relevant
intellectual tasks. In Pound's presentation, however, key concepts
are accorded a floating and unstable reference, quite without system
or homogeneity, to the social process events that precipitate claims
to authoritative decision, the detailed modalities by which claims
are made, the responses of authoritative decision in granting or
denying such claims, and alleged criteria for the appraisal of deci-
sion;68 one is never certain, furthermore, whether particular recom-
mended concepts are being offered or applied for the purpose of
describing decisions, accounting for decisions, or appraising deci-
64. R. POUND, supra note 61, at 24.
65. [d. at 124.
66. R. POUND, III JURISPRUDENCE 15 (1959).
67. R. POUND, supra note 61, at 69.
68. Cf. Jones, A View from the Bridge, LAW AND SOCIETY 39, 41 (1965); Lepaulle, The
Function of Comparative Law, 35 fuRV. L. REV. 838 (1922); K. LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE 7
(1962).
It should be added that Pound himself recognized that his categories were not compre-
hensive and homogeneous. See R. POUND, supra note 61, at 69-70.
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sions.69 Similar imprecisions and ambiguities in Pound's concep-
tions of authority and control, decision, and constitutive process
have already been indicated. One interested in comprehensive
policy-oriented inquiry can applaud the general direction of Pound's
recommendations, but not the details of his road map.70
The principal contribution of the American realists, in indis-
pensable supplement to the aspiration of the sociological frame, to
theory for inquiry about the interrelations of law and social process
has been in making authoritative decision the central focus of atten-
tion. The definition of law as "a function of judicial decisions," as
Felix Cohen noted, "is of tremendous value in the development of
legal science, since it enables us to dispel the supernatural mists
that envelop the legal order and to deal with the elements of the
legal order in objective, scientific terms."71 When authoritative deci-
sions are made the central phenomena subjected to inquiry, it be-
comes possible to be both comprehensive and selective in reference
to the potentially significant features of the larger, encompassing
social process: the events which precipitate claims to authoritative
decision may be categorized in ways convenient for comparisions
through time and across boundaries, the environmental and predis-
positional factors affecting decision may be examined in terms of
their potential significance, decisions may be observed in any de-
sired degree of intensity as distributions of values among claimants,
and the value consequences of decisions both for the claimants and
others, including the larger community, may be assessed.72 Building
upon this insight, various early proponents of the realist frame made
an insistent demand for the reorganization of inquiry about law in
terms of factual categories, as contrasted with complementary tech-
69. Thus, E. PATIERSON, supra note 11, at 509 and W. FRIEDMANN, supra note 11, at 336,
appear to regard Pound's categories as serving primarily the task of evaluation.
70. The principal purpose of Timasheffs important book, THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW
(1939), was to locate "legal order" within "social order" and to sketch their broad potential
interrelations. This he achieves in high degree with eminently workable empirical references
for authority and control and constitutive process. He does not, however, complement this
achievement by providing theory and procedures for performing the relevant intellectual
tasks with respect to a community's aggregate flow of public order decisions. Cf. F. COHEN,
THE LEGAL CONSCIENCE 192 (L. Cohen ed. 1960).
71. [d. at 79.
72. The importance of making decision the central focus of attention is developed in
R. SNYDER, H. BRUCK & B. SAPIN, FOREIGN POLICY DECISION-MAKING (1963).
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nicallegal concepts, both comprehensive and precise.73 Thus, Cook,
in a pioneering article, argues that "a scientific approach to the
study of law will demand observation and study of the actual struc-
ture and functioning of modern social, economic and political life, "74
and Llewellyn called for "a comparison of facts with facts, and not
of words with words"75 and "grouping cases and legal situations into
narrower categories than has been the practice in the past."76 Most
pointedly, Oliphant wrote:
Law teachers should have and law students should get either before or after
they come to the law school a comprehensive knowledge of the whole social
structure. This should not consist of theories as to domestic, economic and
political life nor of unrelated description of disjoined social phenomena. The
whole life which law affects should be viewed comprehensively as an interre-
lation of processes. This understanding cannot be got today by a hit and miss
apprenticeship in life any more than living in our bodies can teach us its
structure and functioning. Systematized study, deliberately focused toward
getting an adequate knowledge of the entire social structure as a functioning
and changing but coherent mechanism, is a basic prerequisite.77
One consequence of this emphasis by the realists was the production
of a large number of new casebooks, emphasizing both a "factual"
organization and the introduction of vast quantities of materials
which would previously have been regarded as "non-legal,"78 and
73. A particularly perceptive and eloquent statement of the basic tenets of American
legal realism is Yntema, American Legal Realism in Retrospect, 14 VAND. L. REV. 317, 322
(1970). He writes:
It would not be inappropriate to consider the movement an offspring of sociological
jurisprudence that purported, in closer conformity with contemporaneous relativistic
theories developed in other fields of science and philosophy, to represent more truly
the trend of the time to understand the law by objective investigation of legal phenom-
ena, not merely in themselves but in relation to their social context, as the necessary
basis of reform.
See W. RUMBLE, JR., AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM (1968); E. PATTERSON, supra note 11, at
537; W. FRIEDMANN, supra note 11, at 295.
74. Cook, Scientific Method and the Law, 13 A.B.A.J. 303, 308 (1927).
75. K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 68, at 19.
76. [d. at 56. In The Normative, The Legal and The Law Jobs: The Problem of Juristic
Method, 49 YALE L.J. 1355 (1940) and, with E.A. Hoebel, in THE CHEYENNE WAY (1941),
Llewellyn made constructive development of the notion of "claim" and distinguished claim
from both group interaction and community response.
77. Oliphant, A Return to Stare Decisis, 14 A.B.A.J. 71, 159 (1928).
78. Illustrative volumes might include K. LLEWELLYN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON SALES
(1930); W. DOUGLAS & C. SHANKS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS UNITS (3
Vol. 1931); L. GREEN, CASES ON TORTS; H. HAVIGHURST, CASES ON CONTRACTS (1934); A. JACOBS,
CASES ON DOMESTIC RELATIONS (2d ed. 1939); R. POWELL, CASES ON TRUSTS AND EsTATES (1932).
HeinOnline -- 37 U. Pitt. L. Rev.  480 1975-1976
480 UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:465
widespread efforts toward reform of law school curricula, some of
which have continuing reverberations.79 This emphasis may have
contributed also to the deepening and enrichment of legal scholar-
ship more generally, both in law reviews and in treatises, which has
occurred within the United States in recent decades.80 Whatever the
realists' other successes or failures, however, they have yet to de-
velop or borrow the comprehensive overarching theory, which they
demanded, for describing, in any necessary particularity, the larger
social process encompassing authoritative decision. The theory with
which they have worked has been largely that of "institutional"
analysis.81 Though quite aware of the importance of values, and
indeed strongly value oriented, they have never developed a com-
prehensive set of value categories for cross-cutting institutional
practices; in the absence of such value categories they have not had
adequate intellectual tools for observing the equivalence or non-
equivalence of different institutional practices through time or
across boundaries.82 Perhaps it should be added that one of the most
79. One of the most constructive and influential calls for reclassification of "the subject
matter of legal education" was Faculty of Law, Columbia University, SUMMARY OF STUDIES
IN LEGAL EDUCATION (H. Oliphant ed. 1928). The impact of this study is noted in Currie, The
Materials of Law Study, 3 J. LEGAL ED. 331, 335 (1951).
The continuing reverberations of these early efforts at reform may be observed in
Roundtable on Curricular Reform, 20 J. LEGAL ED. 387 (1968), presenting papers delivered
at the 1966 annual meeting of the Association of American Law Schools.
More recent stirrings abroad are indicated in THE DIVISION AND CLASSIFICATION OF THE LAW
(J. Jolowicz ed. 1970). Mr. Jolowicz argues that "a system of classification whose purpose is
to enable a review and reform of the law to be carried out must be factual, not conceptual in
approach." He adds that "[w]hat is needed is examination of the law as it operates in
society, not examination of the law's internal logic or theoretical consistency." Id. at 3.
80. A comparison of the major books and reviews in 1930 and in 1970 should be enough
to carry conviction. Auerbach observes that "[a]fter all, the realists did triumph and their
teachings more than any other influence, are reflected in the curricula and methods of our
law schools." Auerbach, supra note 8, at 96.
81. See Hamilton, Institution, ENCYC. Soc. SCI. 84 (1937); K. LLEWELLYN, supra note
68, at 352; Moore, Rational Basis of Legal Institutions, 23 COLUM. L. REV. 609 (1923).
The debt of the realists to Malinowski is often acknowledged. See Malinowski, Culture,
4 ENCYC. Soc. SCI. 621 (1937) and his Introduction to J. HOGBEN, LAW AND ORDER IN POLYNESIA
(1934).
82. One of the more interesting essays by the realists is the concluding chapter, entitled
Some Principles of Political Dynamics, ofT. ARNOLD'S, THE FOLKLORE OF CAPITALISM (1937).
He writes:
In making these generalizations we are handicapped by the lack of a terminology.
There are no adequate terms to describe the study of modern social institutions, either
from the point of view of an anthropologist studying a primitive tribe, or from the point
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influential founders of American legal realism, Judge Jerome Frank,
was determinedly pessimistic about the potentialities of systematic
inquiry about the interrelations of authoritative decision and its
context. Every decision was unique and hopes of comparison and
prediction were largely futile; the "social sciences" were mostly
"social guesses." Thus, he wrote:
The basic trouble is that all the so-called "social sciences" are but phases of
anthropology: Their attempted generalizations relate to the customs and
group beliefs {in the mores, the folkways}, matters, which especially in a
changing modern society, are not readily predictable, because of the numer-
ous elusive and accidental factors, including the fortuitous effects of forceful
{"earth-quake"} personalities.83
The more significant search for viable theory about the larger
social process that encompasses authoritative decision would ap-
pear to derive today, not from jurisprudential frames, but from
various social science fields and from many different specific inves-
tigations of particular problems.84 Contemporary investigations of
society developed from the "mother matrix" of philosophy in seek-
ing to describe the ever more complex situations to which preferen-
tial formulations are applied. In consequence of this descriptive
focus, professional recognition was often given to social scientists
who narrowed their vision to more and more minute problems and
circumstances. As research accumulated and diversified, attention
began to be directed once more to the ways in which each sector of
society interacted with every other.
of view of a psychologist observing a psychopathic personality. Our general literature
of law and economics is forced to leave out what it calls "politics." This pressure on
these sciences necessarily creates a theological terminology which is difficult to use for
the purpose of making observations... . Id. at 347-48. Therefore, I choose the term
"Political Dynamics" to refer to a science about society which treats its ideals, its
literature, its principles of religion, law, economics, political systems, creeds, and
mythologies as part of a single whole and not as separate subjects, each with its own
independent universe of principles. Id. at 349.
83. J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 210 (1949).
84. Some over-view of developments in the different fields is offered in R. HANDY & P.
KURTZ, CURRENT ApPRAISAL OF THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES (Behavioral Research Council Bull.
1964); W. MACKENZIE, POLmcs AND SOCIAL SCIENCE (1967). For an earlier more comprehensive
review see The Development of Social Thought and Institutions, 1 ENCYC. Soc. SCI. 3 (E.
Seligman & A. Johnson eds. 1937). See also C. BLACK, The Study of Modernization: A
Bibliographical Essay, in THE DYNAMICS OF MODERNIZATION 175 (1966).
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In anthropology, for example, the "functionalist" movement
stimulated comparative studies and simultaneously intensified the
demand for comprehensive maps and versatile methods of exploring
the role of law in society.85 Nevertheless, the theories employed in
actual inquiry have not always approximated the double reference
to values and institutions required for both inclusiveness and selec-
tivity.
The important contributions of contemporary political scien-
tists to both theory and procedures have already been noted in our
discussions of authority and control and of constitutive process; yet
political scientists have been so preoccupied with official institu-
tions of power that they have been relatively slow to examine the
counterparts of the community power process that occur within the
boundaries of family, economic and other institutions.86 The sociolo-
gists, on the other hand, have devoted themselves to a significant
extent to the sectors of society that have usually been neglected by
other social scientists. Despite the wide-ranging theories and inquir-
ies conducted by eminent colleagues who have contributed to power
theory, sociologists have frequently failed to cope with problems of
authority and control, including counterpart functions and struc-
tures, throughout society.87 Both political scientists and sociologists
85. Singer, The Concept of Culture, 3 INT'L ENCYC. Soc. SCI. 527, 538 (1968) describes
the emphasis of Malinowski "on culture as a functioning, active, efficient, well-organized
unity, which must be analyzed into component institutions in relation to one another, in
relation to the needs of the human organism, and in relation to the environment, man-made
as well as natural."
Useful references include L. POSPISIL, supra note 3; A. RADCLIFFE-BROWN, supra note 1;
Nader, The Anthropological Study of Law, 67 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 3 (1966); M. GLUCKMAN,
POLITICS, LAW AND RITUAL IN TRIBAL SOCIETY (1965); Vogt, Culture Change, 3INT'L ENCYC. Soc.
SCI. 562 (1968); Fallers, Societal Analysis, 14 INT'L ENCYC. Soc. SCI. 562 (1968); Eisenstadt,
Social Institutions: Comparative Study, 14 INT'L ENCYC. Soc. SCI. 421 (1968); Symposium, 7
LAW AND SOCIETY REV. 537 (1973); and Social Institutions: The Concept, 14 INT'L ENCYC. Soc.
SCI. 409 (1968).
86. Some notion of contemporary developments may be gleaned from R. HOLT & J.
TURNER, THE METHODOLOGY OF COMPARATIVE RESEARCH (1970); H. LASSWELL, THE FUTURE OF
POLITICAL SCIENCE (1963); W. MACKENZIE, POLITICS AND SOCIAL SCIENCE (1967); B. MOORE, JR.,
POLITICAL POWER AND SOCIAL THEORY (1958); C. LINDBLOOM, THE POLICy-MAKING PROCESS
(1968); Deutsch & Rieselbach, Recent Trends in Political Theory and Political Philosophy,
300 ANNALS OF THE AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 139 (1966) (with abundant references);
Symposium, Theory and Policy in International Relations, 24 WORLD POLITICS 3 (R. Tanter
& R. Ullman eds. 1972); Symposium, Social Science Approaches to the Judicial Process, 79
HARV. L. REV. 1551 (1966).
87. For representative samplings of current thought and inquiry, see Skolnick, The
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have been engaged in filling the gaps in their respective fields.
Among the disciplines that cut across conventional lines of dis-
tinction and provide categories and procedures of great importance
for the study of management of decision and choice are social psy-
chology and social psychiatry.88 These disciplines are contributing
to the investigation not merely of perspectives of authority but of
all the interacting norms that occur in society.
Despite its reputation as the social science with an especially
formidable interpenetration of explanatory theory and empirical
inquiry, and of descriptive and preferential vi~wpoints, economics
has been of little importance, until recently, in the study of legal
process, or in the evolution of contextural maps for scrutinizing the
whole of society. The changes that have occurred in recent years are
traceable, in part, to the setbacks that occurred when professional
economists tried to explain and to guide national and international
programs of development.89 Although these programs were phrased
as "economic," it became increasingly evident that power and other
values and institutions were as deeply involved as "wealth." The
urge to formulate policy alternatives with realism--ana precision has
stimulated the adaptation of sophisticated economic analysis to is-
sues of relevance to law and society.90
Sociology of Law in America: Overview and Trends, LAW AND SOCIETY 4 (1965); Selznick, The
Sociology of Law, 9 INT'L ENCYC. Soc. SCI. 50 (1968); LAW AND THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES (L.
Friedman & S. Macauley eds. 1969); SOCIETY AND THE LEGAL ORDER (R. Schwartz & J. Skol-
nick eds. 1970); J. GROSSMAN & M. GROSSMAN, LAW AND CHANGE IN MODERN AMERICA (1971);
F. DAVIS et al., SOCIETY AND THE LAW (1962); LAW AND SOCIOLOGY (W. Ryan ed. 1962); R.
SIMON, SOCIOLOGY OF LAW (1968); G. SAWER, LAW IN SOCIETY (1965).
The potentialities of one popular type of theory are indicated in T. PARSONS, SOCIETIES:
EVOLUTIONARY AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (1966); T. PARSONS, THE SOCIAL SYSTEM (1951);
M. LEVY, THE STRUCTURE OF SOCIETY (1952).
88. J. KATZ, J. GOLDSTEIN & A. DERSHOWITZ, PSYCHOANALYSIS, PSYCHIATRY AND LAW
(1967); J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (1973);
A. GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE (1967); J. GOLDSTEIN & J. KATZ, THE FAMILY AND THE
LAW (1965); A. BROOKS, LAW, PSYCHIATRY AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM (1974); and J. KATZ
& A. CAPRON. CATASTROPHIC DISEASES: WHO DECIDES WHAT (1975).
89. Lasswell & Holmberg, Toward a General Theory of Directed Value Accumulation
and Institutional Development, in POLITICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE DEVELOPMENT (R. Braibanti
ed.1969).
90. Leff, Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism about Nominalism, 60 VA. L. REV.
451 (1974); Posner, The Econamic Approach to Law, 53 TEx. L. REv. 757 (1975); G. CALABRESI,
THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS (1970); R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw (1972); B. ACKERMAN
et al., THE UNCERTAIN SEARCH FOR ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY (1974).
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The cumulative impact upon theory and procedures of the
many relatively recent empirical studies by representatives from
various disciplines of the interrelations of various isolated features
of legal and social process is not yet clear.91 Unhappily, many of
these studies have not had the benefit of appropriate guiding theory
about either authoritative decision or social process, and many of
them have been inspired by incomplete notions of the relevant intel-
lectual tasks and of the interdependences of these tasks, including
the dependence of even the scientific task upon the adequate per-
formance of other tasks. 92
The reference to policy analysis draws attention to a movement
that is bringing research in all social science fields in closer contact
with the requirements of an approach to law that is "contextual,"
"problem oriented," and "multi-method." In an explicit "policy
science" emphasis, specialists in all value-institution sectors have
been busily involved in contemporary activities that break through
many traditional barriers that tended to segregate intellectuals from
one another and from active participants in the decision and choice
processes of community-wide and of more delimited configurations
in the world community as a whole, or of its subdivisions.93 The
91. Some of these studies are described in the references in note 87 supra. See also
Symposium, Law and Social Change, 13 AM. BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST 483 (S. Nagel ed. 1970).
The course books by Friedmann and Macaulay and by Schwartz and Skolnick reproduce a
number of representative studies, with abundant references. The journal LAW & SOCIETY
REVIEW publishes an annual bibliography. See, e.g., 6 LAW & SOCIETY REV. 443 (1972).
92. Cf. Jones, Impact Research and Sociology of Law: Some Tentative Proposals, 1966
WIS. L. REV. 331; Auerbach, Legal Tasks for the Sociologists, 1 LAW & SOCIETY REV. 91 (1966).
A recent example of overemphasis on isolating the scientific task is Black, The Bounda-
ries of Legal Sociology, Working Paper No.5, THE RUSSELL SAGE PROGRAM IN LAW AND THE
SOCIAL SCIENCES Y.L.S. (1972).
93. This emphasis aspires toward the creation of a comprehensive conceptual map and
an inclusive set of terms for thinking and talking about society, policy, and law that will
facilitate performance of all relevant intellectual tasks. See H. LASSWELL, PREVIEW OF Poucy
SCIENCES (1971); Policy Sciences, 12 INT'L ENCYC. Soc. SCI. 181 (1968); The Emerging Concep-
tion of the Policy Sciences, 1 POLICY SCIENCES 3 (1970); Lasswell & Holmberg, Toward a
General Theory of Directed Value Accumulation and Institutional Development, in POLmCAL
AND ADMINISTRATIVE DEVELOPMENT (R. Braibanti ed. 1969); THE POLICY SCIENCES (H. Lasswell
& D. Lerner eds. 1951); Y. DROR, PUBLIC POLICYMAKING REEXAMINED (1968); COMMUNICATION
SCIENCES AND LAW (L. Allen & M. Caldwell eds. 1965); W. !sARD, GENERAL THEORY: SOCIAL,
POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND REGIONAL, WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO DECISION-MAKING (1969).
Continuing ferment among legal scholars is suggested in LAW IN ACHANGING AMERICA (G.
Hazard ed. 1968); W. FRIEDMANN, TRANSNATIONAL LAW IN ACHANGING SOCIETY (1972); J. HALL,
COMPARATIVE LAW AND SOCIAL THEORY (1963); Miller, The Role of the University Law School
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interplay between philosophical, historical, scientific, projective,
and policy invention, evaluation and selection is becoming more
intense and productive. The implications for jurisprudence are
abundantly apparent; and, although it lies outside our present scope
of inquiry, it is not too much to expect that jurisprudential develop-
ments may have reciprocal impacts in other areas of knowledge and
action.
in the Evolutionary Scheme, 1971 U. ILL. L.F. 1; Reich, Toward the Humanistic Study of
Law, 74 YALE L.J. 1402 (1965); Miller, On the Interdependence of Law and the Behavioral
Sciences, 43 TEX. L. REV. 1094 (1965),
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